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ARGUMENT
I.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN AN UNDUE INFLUENCE WILL CONTEST
IS A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE,
A.
Buttar's Estate Stands for the Proposition that
the Burden of Persuasion in an Undue Influence Will Contest
is a Preponderance of the Evidence,
Ms. Birch asserts "that a careful reading of [In Re
Buttarsf Estate1 discloses that the Court is there talking
about the burden of going forward and is not addressing the
ultimate issue of "Burden of persuasion11.
Brief at 9-10.

This is plainly wrong.

Appellant's Reply

The burden of going

forward has nothing to do with concepts like clear and
convincing evidence and preponderance of the evidence; those
terms can only apply to the ultimate burden of persuasion.
Thus, where the Supreme Court in Buttarsf Estate states that
the contestant must prove "by a preponderance of evidence"
that the testatrix "was acting under . . . undue influence,"
the Court is addressing the same issue Mr. McCullough is
raising on this cross appeal:

What is the burden of

persuasion when a will contestant alleges undue influence?
The Supreme Court stated that the burden is a preponderance
of the evidence.
(Utah 1953).

In Re Buttars1 Estate. 261 P.2d 171, 172

Thus, Mr. McCullough asks the Court of Appeals

to reverse Judge Daniels1 ruling on this point.

1

B.
Courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, Use the
Word "Substantial" when referring to Cases involving Clear
and Convincing Evidence and Preponderance of the Evidence,
Four Utah Supreme Court decisions state that there must
be "substantial" proof of undue influence in order to
sustain a verdict denying probate to a will on that basis.
In Re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1952); see
also In Re Bryanfs Estate, 25 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1933); In
Re Goldsberry's Estate, 81 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Utah 1938); In
Re George's Estate, 112 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1941).
Throughout her Reply Brief, Ms. Birch argues directly and
implicitly that the Supreme Court's use of the word
"substantial" is equivalent to requiring clear and
convincing evidence.

Ms. Birch's own authorities dispute

this.
For instance, Ms. Birch cites C.J.S. for the following
proposition:
According to some authorities, a
preponderance of the evidence is necessary
and sufficient to establish undue influence
in the execution of a will. However, in
numerous cases, it has been said that undue
influence, invalidating a will, must be
established by clear, satisfactory, and
convincing evidence, by compelling evidence,
or by the manifest weight of the evidence.
In any event, undue influence in the
execution of a will must be shown by
substantial evidence and evidence which
merely raises a suspicion or conjecture that

2

the will was the product of undue influence
is insufficient.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 14.

94 C.J.S. Wills §251 (1956)

(emphasis added; citations omitted).

What this citation

shows is that "substantial" evidence is required regardless
of whether the burden of proof is clear and convincing
evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence.
Likewise, Ms. Birch cites the New Mexico Supreme Court
case of Lumpkins v. McPhee for the proposition that evidence
is not substantial unless it is "clear, strong and
convincing."

Appellant's Reply Brief at 11; Lumpkins v.

McPhee. 286 P.2d 299, 306 (N.M. 1955).

However, the

paragraph proceeding Ms. Birch's citation refutes her
argument.
Ordinarily, the evidence is deemed
substantial if it tips the scales in favor of
the party on whom rests the burden of proof,
even though it barely tips them. He is then
said to have established his case by a
preponderance of the evidence. A finding in
his favor on the decisive issue is thus said
to be supported by substantial evidence.
Lumpkins, 286 P.2d at 306. What this case shows is that the
concept of substantial evidence is equally important in
cases where the burden is a preponderance of the evidence as
it is in cases where the burden is clear and convincing
evidence.

Utah likewise recognizes that substantial

3

evidence can be required in cases requiring a preponderance
of the evidence.

Rowe v. Rowe, 365 P.2d 797, 797 (Utah

1961) ("In line with our oft-expressed determination that on
appeal the conclusions of the trial court in a case like
this will remain inviolate if supported by a preponderance
of competent, substantial and believable evidence . . . . " ) ;
Piute Reservoir & Irr. Co. v. West Panauitch I.& R. Co., 3 64
P.2d 113, 116 (Utah 1961) ("[The applicant] must support a
decision in its favor on this question by substantial
evidence, and it has the burden of convincing the trier of
the facts by a preponderance of all of the evidence . .
..").

Thus, the Court should reject Ms. Birch's efforts to

equate "substantial" proof with clear and convincing
evidence.
C.
Deed Cases Show that the Burden in Undue Influence
Will Cases should be a Preponderance of the Evidence.
Mr. McCullough agrees with Ms. Birch that an action
challenging the validity of a deed on the grounds of undue
influence must be proven on the basis of clear and
convincing evidence.

Appellant's Reply Brief at 12. From

this, Ms. Birch argues that the same result should apply in
will contests.

However, this does not follow.

4

Any attack on a deed, including an attack based on the
alleged incomptency of the grantor, requires a showing of
clear and convincing evidence.
P.2d 839, 849 (Utah 1958).

Richmond v. Ballard, 325

A will contestant's burden of

proof on allegations that the testator was incompetent is a
preponderance of the evidence.
702 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1985).

Matter of Estate of Kesler,

Thus, deed contests and will

contests cannot be construed in pari materia.
Moreover, while a deed is generally effective upon
delivery, a will is generally not effective until admitted
to probate.

Compare Kresser v. Peterson, 675 P.2d 1193,

1994 (Utah 1984) with U.C.A. §75-3-101 et sea. (1978).
Thus, to protect innocent third parties, deeds need a strong
presumption of validity.

On the other hand, since a will is

not admissable to probate until after its validity is
determined, there is no similar need for a strong
presumption of validity.
In addition, many times the grantor of the deed is
available to testify; the testator, by contrast, is never
available.

As a result, in undue influence will contests,

the contestant will be left with circumstantial evidence.
As the Utah Supreme Court has observed:
In a case of this sort, it is not usually
possible to procure direct evidence of

5

statements and conduct which one accused of
undue influence has used on the decedent•
One of the two is dead; the other cannot be
expected to give evidence against himself.
The ususal way is to give the surrounding
circumstances from which deductions may be
made.
In Re Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Utah 1935).

To

leave the contestant to circumstantial evidence and require
proof by clear and convincing evidence puts an enormous and
unfair burden on contestants and makes Utah's aging
population vulnerable to the unscrupulous.

Accordingly,

while any attack on a deed requires clear and convincing
evidence, claims of undue influence in will contests should
be based on a preponderance of the evidence.
D.
The Burden of Proof does not Vary Depending on the
Facts of the Case.
Ms. Birch twice suggests that the burden of persuasion
in undue influence will contests varies depending on the
facts of the case.

Appellant's Reply Brief at 12-13 ("the

appropriate rule of law was applied in requiring that the
proof of persuasion be that of clear and convincing
evidence, taking into account the 'facts and circumstances'
of the case at hand"), at 15 ("we respectfully submit that
the trial judge made the correct pronouncement of law under
the facts and circumstances involved").

6

This is false. The

burden of proof will be the same for all litigants who
allege undue influence in a will contest.

The determination

of whether a particular litigant has met that burden will
vary from case to case depending on the evidence adduced.
That is the only aspect that varies; the law remains
constant.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, if the Court of Appeals does not affirm
Judge Daniels' decision on the basis of his ruling on the
competency issue, Mr. McCullough requests that the Court
affirm the result by reversing Judge Daniels' decision on
the standard of proof required when a will contestant
alleges undue influence.
Dated September 11, 1992.
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